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of the Slovak Republic deﬁ  nes and 
characterizes two types of basic 
threats for the national security. 
These are military threats and non-
military threats, see Figure 1.
Fig. 1.  Threats for Slovak Republic
Regarding the issues of terrorism 
it is necessary to focus especially on 
non-military threats that, according 
to the military strategy represent 
activities threatening the security, 
and employ mostly non-military 
means [3]. Those threats include: 
terrorist activities, illegal arms 
trade, internationally organized 
crime, migration or mass inﬂ  ux of 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of the armed forces 
of the Slovak Republic as the top 
doctrinal document offers answers 
to some basic questions, e.g. how 
and when will the state use its armed 
force in the ﬁ  ght against terrorism 
[1]. These issues must be viewed 
from the perspective of strategic 
relations, especially in political 
and legal context, which represents 
determining allies, opponents, and 
enemies, neutral or uninvolved 
partners in the concrete situation. 
The most unpredictable elements of 
the strategic environment for us are 
non-governmental political elements 
including semi-military and terrorist 
organizations [2].      
The employment of military 
power of the state in this environment 
is very difﬁ  cult and certainly the most 
extreme tool of promoting the state 
interest, in case all other methods 
have failed. The defence strategy 
Threats for Slovak Republic
Military 
threats
Non- Military 
threatsrefugees beyond control, religious or 
ethnic extremism, riots, social riots, 
natural and environmental disasters, 
accidents and catastrophes, as well 
as  many other activities[4]. 
Terrorist activities of individuals 
or organized groups and international 
networks are extremely dangerous 
for international security. Thus, 
the armed forces must be ready to 
support the organs of state power or 
even assume full responsibility for 
ﬁ  ghting terrorism.
Regarding the ﬁ  ght  against 
terrorism, the armed forces of the 
Slovak Republic might be used 
in two basic types of operations, 
which are called defensive 
counterterrorist measures and 
offensive counterterrorist measures 
[5]. Contents of these activities are 
described in Figure 2. 
Regarding the position of SR 
in the centre of Europe and its low 
involvement in crisis areas of the 
world the biggest threat for us is 
probably from the air – air terrorism. 
Some other state’ kidnapped plane or 
some other source on the Slovak sky 
could be used for terrorist actions 
in our country or in neighbouring 
countries. Thus, the protection of 
air space will be as important as the 
protection of Slovak and European 
borders.
When SR joined NATO and 
accepted the goals of the forces [FG- 
Force Goal] it became a part of the 
joint air space of NATO countries 
[NATINADS – NATO Integrated Air 
Defence System] with its inherent 
rights and duties.
Basic types 
of counterterrorism ﬁ  ght
Defensive 
counter
terrorist 
measures
Offensive 
counter
terrorist 
measures
It includes: 
collecting 
intelligence 
information, 
uncovering, 
preventing or 
eliminating 
terrorist plans 
of terrorist 
attacks, including 
measures 
for reducing 
vulnerability 
of individuals 
and facilities to 
terrorist attacks.
It includes: 
prevention, 
elimination 
of, or reaction 
to terrorist 
attacks or plans 
of attacks. It 
includes also 
collecting 
intelligence 
information 
and analyzing 
possible threats. 
Fig. 2. Types of operations of the ﬁ  ght 
against terrorism (1)
The protection of air space of SR 
within NATINADS should be viewed 
from two main perspectives [6]:
- activities against military 
and unidentiﬁ   ed air objects under 
the command of Combined Air 
Operations Centre (CAOC); 
-  activities against any civilian 
air object used as a terrorist weapon, 
the co-called RENEGADE, which 
are exclusively in the competences 
of NGA – National Governmental 
Authority, which has right to 
use national forces selected for 
NATINADS.
2. PROTECTION 
OF AIR SPACE OF SR
In line with SR’s Constitution, 
valid laws and legal norms, the 
Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic meet the objectives that are stated in 
its Defence strategy.
One of the objectives is also 
maintaining the necessary staff of air 
force in order to secure permanent 
protection of the sovereignty of our 
air space and, since SR joined NATO, 
also the protection of the integrated 
air space [5].
The protection of SR’s air space 
is provided by the Emergency 
System of Air Force of the Armed 
Forces of SR (ES AF AF SR), which 
meets the objectives in line with the 
act on “the organization of activities 
of the government and central 
government”, Act No. 319/2002 
Coll. on Defence of SR, Act No. 
321/2002 Coll. on The Armed Forces 
of SR and Act No. 143/1998 Coll. on 
“Civil Aviation”.       
ES AF AF SR in line with the 
“Operations plan of force and means 
utilization” is the set of measures 
performed by forces and means of 
the air force, surveillance and ﬁ  re 
equipment of air defence to secure 
the air space of SR, the integrated 
air space of NATO and providing 
assistance to aircrafts in emergency 
situations.
Priority tasks of ES AF AF SR 
include:
- checking if the air trafﬁ  c 
follows the valid rules, regulations 
and international agreements;
- continuous surveillance of air 
space of SR, detection and evaluation 
of air objects;
- intervening against intruders of 
air space of SR;
- providing help for aircrafts in 
emergency situations in the air space 
of SR;
- mutual exchange of information 
on situation in air space and weather 
conditions with neighbouring 
countries;
- cooperation with air search and 
rescue service;
- participation in the protection 
of the integrated air space of NATO 
within NATINADS.
ES AF AF SR consists of organs 
of command and control, emergency 
aircrafts, surveillance and ﬁ  re 
equipment of air defence.
Emergency aircrafts and 
surveillance means of air defence 
provide permanent protection of 
air space and ﬁ  re equipment of air 
defence can be included in  ES AF AF 
SR if needed on a special command.
Emergency aircrafts are deployed 
against intruders according to strict 
rules and criteria. After the detection 
of an intruder aircraft emergency 
aircrafts take off in order to ﬁ  nd out 
the necessary data for identifying 
the intruder aircraft and to offer help 
using optic and radio signals, which 
are published for all users of air 
space in military and civilian rules 
for ﬂ  ying. If the intruder aircraft does 
not follow the emergency aircrafts’ 
instructions, it is stopped from 
threatening the security of the SR and 
its citizens.
The Air Force of SR, in line 
with the accepted commitments of 
goals of SR, meets the objectives 
of integration into NATINADS by 
building infrastructure, modernizing 
selected machinery, safe certiﬁ  cation 
of people, machinery, facilities 
and selected areas. The selected 
staff is preferentially educated in 
technical and linguistic ﬁ  elds.  The 
acquired skills and habits were used 
for certiﬁ  cation in line with NATO standards. The Command of Air 
Force of SR issues professional 
aids, methodologies of activities 
and regularly updates documents 
in line with NATO documents. The 
Centre for Command of Air Force 
of SR processes and distributes air 
situation to the competent CAOC and 
CRC [Control and Report Centre] of 
neighbouring states of NATO [8].
3. AIR TERRORISM THREAT
After 9/11 all countries over the 
world faced a completely new form 
of terrorism – air terrorism threat 
using civilian aircrafts as weapons.
The term RENEGADE is used 
to deﬁ   ne civilian aircrafts that are 
suspected of being used as weapons 
to perform terrorist attacks.
Dealing with the concept of 
RENEGADE is connected with 
the problem of protecting air 
space. We can simply say that the 
activities against an air target such 
as RENEGADE are a speciﬁ  c part of 
protection of air space.
3.1. TAKING ACTION 
AGAINST RENEGADE 
OBJECTS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS
Civil aviation rules result from 
Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago, 1944), which was 
ratiﬁ   ed by Czechoslovak Republic 
in 1947 and published in codex 
No. 147/1947. This Convention in
Article 3, letter a, says: “The 
contracting States recognize that 
every State must refrain from resorting 
to the use of weapons against civil 
aircraft in ﬂ  ight and that, in case of 
interception, the lives of persons on 
board and the safety of aircraft must 
not be endangered”.
In addition to the Convention 
there are also Convention on Offence 
and Certain Other Acts Commited 
Aboard Aircraft (Tokio, 1963), 
Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(Haag, 1970) and Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
(Montreal, 1971).
International conventions and 
agreements on civil aviation strictly 
prohibit the usage of weapons against 
civil aircrafts.
3.2. RENEGADE CONCEPT 
IN NATO
The air space protection 
principles during peace for 
supporting the integrity of European 
air space of NATO, for protecting 
NATO countries and their forces 
from air attacks are based on set 
rules and standards of NATO. The 
International Military Staff (IMS) 
prepares a document to elaborate the 
issue of NATINADS more in detail. 
The mentioned document deﬁ  nes 
the term RENEGADE, deﬁ  nes  the 
competences, responsibilities and 
methods of command and control for 
individual command levels of NATO 
and for military as well as civil 
organs of control of air trafﬁ  c when 
preparing measures, coordination 
and intervention against objects such 
as RENEGADE [6].
If this is the case, the state in line 
with the international law must avoid 
the decision to use weapons against a civil aircraft and it must accept all 
necessary measures to secure and 
lead the civil aircraft in accordance 
with the competent rules, standards 
and recommended methods included 
in the Chicago Convention and its 
amendments. The state must not be 
passive if it faces a RENEGADE 
object threat. 
Obviously, according to 
international law principles, no 
sovereign state has limits that could 
prevent it from reacting in case of 
violation of its territorial integrity 
or political independence, or if 
its principles related to the state’s 
responsibilities are violated in some 
ways.
Sovereign states face the threat 
of using force against their territorial 
integrity or political independence 
by launching corresponding 
activities,  which will secure their 
preparation for averting the threat 
by activating the elements of air 
space defence.
Any state is responsible for 
protecting its territorial integrity 
and political independence, 
which also includes protection of 
its national interests and people 
within its territory. Under certain 
circumstances the activity against 
RENEGADE object can be justiﬁ  ed 
by the protection of these legitimate 
interests. If it is necessary the state 
is authorized to use force to protect 
itself from activities which would 
violate its independence.
In this case we must consider 
activities against the object that 
violates the state sovereignty and 
independence as well as security 
of the citizens who are entitled to 
protection and freedom, too.
It is not important if the intruder 
uses civil or military approaches. 
It is the intention that is important. 
In case of RENEGADE object, the 
goals and intentions of the intruder 
might be achieved by direct action, 
which can then cause corresponding 
reactions of the competent state.
In the Czech Republic, for 
instance, the issue of RENEGADE 
objects was partially handled during 
the NATO summit in Prague. Before 
the summit the CR accepted Act 
No. 482/2002 Coll. valid just during 
the summit, which deﬁ  ned  the 
competences of the national authority 
in line with the legal order of CR 
regarding the usage of force against 
an object and ordering the usage of 
weapons if necessary. A similar Act 
was also accepted by other NATO and 
EU countries. These states accepted 
NATO regulations and standards 
regarding the RENEGADE concept, 
created a national authority with 
the competence to decide on using 
weapons against RENEGADE, and 
accepted the responsibility for the 
damage caused by activities against 
suchlike object.
3.3. WAYS OF PROTECTION 
FROM RENEGADE-LIKE 
OBJECTS IN THE LEGAL 
ORDER OF SR
Participation of SR in the 
Alliance’s system of collective 
protection of air space requires 
handling the questions connected to 
the protection of the integrated air 
space of NATO.
The RENEGADE concept is 
handled in response to the acceptance 
of the Concept of Integrated Air Defence of NATO. In order to 
solve the RENEGADE concept an 
interdepartmental committee has been 
established under the authority of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
of SR. It consists of staff members 
of MFA, Ministry of Transport, Posts 
and Telecommunications, Ministry 
of Defence, Civil Aviation Authority 
of SR and MS of SR. The missions of 
this committee are to deﬁ  ne the term 
RENEGADE legally, to elaborate 
legal analyses of methods of solving 
situations, in which a civil object is 
classiﬁ  ed as a military target, to adjust 
the mechanism of decision-making 
and deciding on RENEGADE - like 
objects legally and to deﬁ  ne  legal 
consequences in case of elimination 
of RENEGADE - like objects. 
At present the Air Force of SR 
have the means, tools and mechanisms 
necessary for an action against a 
RENEGADE - like air object in 
case this object can be considered a 
military target.
Crucial missions of the Air Force 
in the ﬁ  ght against terrorism include 
the protection of objects of national 
importance. After 9/11 2001 our 
objects of special importance – the 
capital city Bratislava and nuclear 
powerplants Mochovce and Jaslovské 
Bohunice were protected from air 
attacks by units of air defence of low 
and medium range (Figure 3). 
Before the deployment of these 
units there was a simulation of 
activities of the units against an 
intruder based on prof. Sopóci’s 
project from the end of the 80s called 
Optimization of air defence for the 
needs of the units of air defence 
of land forces [7].  Based on the 
digitalized model of terrain it was 
possible to display the defended 
units and objects. The chosen criteria 
allowed optimization of the choice of 
ﬁ  ring positions and battle formations 
of the units of air defence of land 
forces, the calculation and display of 
destroyed areas for various altitudes, 
speed and RCS, the possibility of 
centralized control of various types 
of anti-aircraft rocket systems. The 
mentioned project was innovated in 
the ﬁ  rst half of the 90s because of 
organization changes, modernization 
of armament and especially because 
of new hardware and operation 
systems in computers. Based on the 
calculations of areas of destruction 
and areas of ﬁ   ring tasks (yellow 
colour and green colour or outer 
curves) the units were deployed in 
formations that were considered 
optimal (Figure 1). Aviation 
resources (emergency aircrafts – 
Mig-29) were used for protection of 
objects of special importance.
4. CONCLUSIONS
If we admit that air terrorism is a 
dominant global threat  for SR, then 
the AF of SR have the mission to 
provide protection, countermeasures 
and measures to reduce the impacts 
on eliminating the results of terrorist 
actions.
The participation of SR in the 
system of collective protection of air 
space of the Alliance resulted in the 
need to solve problems connected 
to the protection of integrated air 
space of NATO. If these problems 
are solved, the technical side of 
the problem will be activities 
against RENEGADE-like objects. The political and legal context of the 
problems remains open.
According to the mentioned facts 
we can say that the Air Force of SR 
has the means, tools and mechanisms 
to intervene against air objects such 
as RENEGADE. 
However, according to the current 
valid laws, norms and regulations it is 
not possible to intervene against civil 
aircraft using weapons and threaten 
the security of people aboard the 
aircraft. Thus the question is: when 
can an aircraft not respecting the 
guidelines of organs of air trafﬁ  c 
Fig. 3. Protection of objects of special importance by air defence units
command and the other participating 
aircrafts be considered a reasonable 
threat to be declared a military 
target?
The territory of SR is too small 
to identify, decide on classiﬁ  cation 
and take countermeasures in case 
of RENEGADE threat. That means 
that SR can effectively apply  the 
RENEGADE concept just in 
the international context, i.e. in 
cooperation with neighbouring 
countries within the integrated air 
space of NATO [9].
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